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Abstract 
 
The pressures exerted by migrant workers’ countries of origin, regional calls for migrant protection, 
and global initiatives have pushed the Malaysian government for labour reforms in line with Interna-
tional Labour Organization standards. A weak labour migration mechanism has led to human traf-
ficking, debt bondage, and workers’ exploitation.  Since 2018, Malaysia has concluded and renegoti-
ated improved memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with countries of origin to address forced la-
bour and human-trafficking. Reforming the recruitment system is formalised through government-to
-government agreements to eliminate agents, enhance ethical recruitment, and adopt a zero migra-
tion-cost model. The analysis shows that the newly negotiated MoUs are significant in tackling the 
issue of irregular migration in three aspects, by including a clause on repatriation, changing to the 
government recruitment model, and adopting the employer-pays model. This research utilises official 
documents, media statements, and secondary literature.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2018, the Malaysian Gov-
ernment declared a moratorium on all bi-
lateral memoranda of understanding 
(MoUs) while seeking to renegotiate the 
terms, as part of its efforts against human 
trafficking and forced labour. Through 
bilateral MoUs with countries of origin, 
Malaysia sought to enhance ethical re-
cruitment standards (ILO, 2018). Malay-
sia’s first initiative towards ethical re-
cruitment was implemented through the 
Nepal–Malaysia MoU signed in 2018, 
which stipulated that employers would 
bear all the recruitment costs. The agree-
ment, at the Nepalese government’s initi-
ative, was a milestone for protecting the 
rights of Nepali migrant workers. They 
could work in Malaysia at zero cost, be-
cause their Malaysian employers would 
bear all costs, including the repatriation 
cost. The Malaysian government reiterat-
ed its commitment to follow the princi-
ples of the ILO convention by providing 
basic facilities to Nepali workers (Poudal, 
2018).  It was an example of a govern-
ment-to-government (G2G) recruitment 
plan that aimed to eliminate private re-
cruiters while curbing human trafficking 
and exploitation of workers. The high re-
cruitment costs borne by migrant work-
ers under private recruitment processes 
had led to incidents of modern-day slav-
ery known as debt bondage. Nepal, Indo-
nesia, and Bangladesh are the top three 
source countries for the approximately 
two million registered foreign workers in 
Malaysia (Malaysia targets middlemen, 
2018).  
The move towards zero-cost and 
employer-pays recruitment approaches 
demonstrated the government’s commit-
ment to ethical recruitment, replacing the 
previous business model. Ethical recruit-
ment necessarily eliminates the interme-
diaries and middlemen who charged hid-
den costs incurred in the migrant recruit-
ment process. Forced labour and debt 
bondage are the result of unethical re-
cruitment (Hall, 2019). Unethical recruit-
ment and worker exploitation have been 
the major reasons underlying the suspen-
sion of the supply of foreign workers by 
the source countries.  In 2018, Nepal tem-
porarily banned the sending of its work-
ers due to the exorbitant fees charged by 
private companies appointed by the Ma-
laysian government (Perumal, 2018). In 
2018, Indonesia considered a ban on its 
citizens working as maids in Malaysia, fol-
lowing the death of an Indonesian domes-
tic worker, until the employment process 
is restructured. Migrant rights’ groups, 
netizens, lawmakers, and activists called 
for a stricter legal framework to protect 
the welfare of migrant workers. Since the 
expiration of the MoU between the two 
countries in 2016, there has been no co-
operation between them (Malaysia’s 
meeting with Indonesia, 2018).  
Meanwhile, in January 2020, Cam-
bodia urged Malaysia to expedite the sign-
ing of an MoU on anti-human trafficking 
to protect Cambodian workers, especially 
domestic helpers. Cambodia is reluctant 
to send its domestic workers to Malaysia 
until the agreement is signed, despite the 
fact that Cambodia’s Labour Ministry had 
lifted the moratorium on Cambodian 
maids. In January 2018, after several bi-
lateral talks with Malaysia on welfare and 
legal protection (Cambodia urges Malay-
sia, 2020; David, 2020), Cambodia an-
nounced the lifting of its ban on sending 
maids to Malaysia. As for the Bangladesh–
Malaysia foreign-worker crisis, Malaysia 
froze the recruitment of Bangladeshi 
workers in 2018 due to the broken re-
cruitment processes of private agencies. 
The Bangladeshi government refused to 
send its citizens until a low-cost and 
transparent recruitment system is imple-
mented. Malaysia urged Bangladesh to 
better manage the unchecked sending of 
its workers. Both countries acknowledged 
that the high cost is caused by the exist-
ence of illegal brokers in both countries. 
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The Ministry of Human Resources 
(MOHR) was concerned about possible 
sanctions imposed, as Malaysia had been 
placed on the Tier 2 Watch List of the US 
State Department’s Trafficking in Persons 
(TIP) report for 2018 and 2019 consecu-
tively. In order to prevent labour abuse by 
employers and exploitation by agents, 
Malaysia is working closely with the 
countries of origin to implement “zero 
cost for the workers” (Thomas, 2020). 
This positive development is 
prompted by both internal and external 
factors.  Internally, the labour reform took 
place under the new Pakatan Harapan 
(PH) government that took over the ad-
ministration beginning in May 2018. The 
MOHR initiated a series of reforms with 
the appointment of an “Independent Com-
mittee on the Management of Foreign 
Workers,” in August 2018, to streamline 
the policies and management of foreign 
workers. Malaysia renegotiated its MoUs 
with Nepal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and 
India, which would expire soon. The main 
obstacle was ensuring migrant workers’ 
protection, especially for domestic help-
ers (Mohd Arop, 2018). Countries of 
origin, such as Indonesia, Nepal, Cambo-
dia, and Bangladesh, have played an ac-
tive role in safeguarding the welfare and 
safety of their migrant workers, as dis-
cussed below.  
Reforming the labour migration sys-
tem goes in tandem with regional and in-
ternational efforts towards migrant pro-
tection. Regional commitment to labour 
migration is promoted through the 
ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Work-
ers, signed on November 14, 2017, by the 
leaders of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regional instru-
ments such as the ASEAN Consensus play 
a limited role, as they are non-binding and 
do not carry legal weight (Rother, 2018; 
Thuzar, 2018). The Malaysian govern-
ment is facing international pressure to 
address human trafficking and migrant 
exploitation following the observations in 
the US State Department’s TIP Report. 
The country could face international sanc-
tions prohibiting foreign countries from 
investing in Malaysia if its status drops to 
Tier 3. Malaysia was downgraded to the 
Tier 2 watchlist in 2018, similar to the 
same position it occupied in 2015 and 
2016 (Govt working on improved, stand-
ardised MOU, 2018).  
Under pressure from the migrants’ 
countries of origin, possible international 
trade sanctions, regional commitment, 
and civil society movements, Malaysia has 
rewritten the terms of its MoUs in line 
with International Labour Organization 
(ILO) standards. Based on the 2018 model 
agreement with Nepal, Malaysia negotiat-
ed improved and standardised MoUs with 
other countries of origins. The standard-
ised MoUs are significant in tackling the 
issue of irregular migration in these three 
aspects: First, they include a clause on re-
patriation, addressing the problem of mi-
grants who overstay at the end of their 
employment contracts. Second, they are 
based on the G2G recruitment model to 
tackle human trafficking and workers’ ex-
ploitation. Third, the cost of recruitment 
is to be covered by the hiring companies 
rather than the foreign workers, known 
as zero migration cost (Govt working on 
improved, standardised MOU, 2018; Man-
dal, 2018; Poudal, 2018). These develop-
ments can be interpreted as enhancing 
the capacity of legal migration to ensure 
workers are safely deployed to Malaysia.  
This article examines the develop-
ment of migrant labour recruitment re-
forms in Malaysia, looking at how Malay-
sia has resorted to bilateral MoUs to re-
solve the issue of irregular migration. The 
first section evaluates the role of regional 
migration governance of labour mobility. 
This is followed by an analysis of the new 
elements introduced by the MoUs signed 
by Malaysia with labour-sending states, 
namely the implementation of G2G re-
cruitment, the transfer of recruitment 
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costs to employers, and the inclusion of 
repatriation clauses. Finally, it reviews 
the effects of such reforms on Malaysia’s 
migration governance. The findings show 
that bilateralism is a more effective mode 
of regulating irregular labour migration 
into Malaysia caused by limited regional 
migration governance, and of addressing 
recruitment, mobility, and repatriation of 
migrant labours. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This research is based on the Malay-
sian case study, as the country has initiat-
ed major labour reforms since 2018 to-
wards the elimination of outsourcing 
companies, ensuring zero migration costs 
and ethical recruitment. These belated 
reforms are a milestone in the labour mi-
gration history of Malaysia, after having 
regulated labour migration for more than 
three decades, since 1984. The develop-
ments are significant as they address la-
bour relations with sending countries and 
adhere to ILO labour standards, at a time 
when regionalism of migration is emerg-
ing in Southeast Asia with the region em-
bracing migration-related declarations 
and initiatives. This paper draws upon 
document analysis of migration-related 
declarations of ASEAN, official reports of 
international migrant associations, sec-
ondary literature, press releases, and the 
press statements of civil society actors 
and migrant associations, as well as 
online newspapers. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Southeast Asia, labour mobility 
has been addressed exclusively from eco-
nomic, trade, and security perspectives. 
When the ASEAN was established in 
1967, its charter did not consider the 
movement of labour. Since the economic 
liberalization through the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (1992), labour migration has 
been approached in isolation from eco-
nomic integration. The migration subject 
has not been considered because coun-
tries of origin and of destination have 
conflicting interests. Countries of destina-
tion want to maintain their control over 
their national migration policies, which 
have security implications, while coun-
tries of origin desire more protective 
measures for their citizens working over-
seas and some form of integration. A re-
gional framework for migration could 
properly address irregular migration 
(Battistella, 2002). 
Scholars suggest that the low-skilled 
labour migration framework is absent in 
the regional migration governance. Re-
gional instruments, such as the ASEAN 
Agreement on the Movement of Natural 
Persons (MNP) and the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC), mainly focused on the 
governance of the movement of skilled 
workers and they consider questions of 
regional migration as part of economic 
integration efforts (Lavenex et al., 2016; 
Ramji-Nogales, 2017). The MNP (2012) 
facilitates the mobility of skilled labourers 
and professionals for the purposes of in-
vestment and business, in accordance 
with the 1995 ASEAN Framework Agree-
ment on Services (Lavenex et al., 2016). 
The MNP aims to create an effective 
mechanism to further liberalize and facili-
tate the movement of natural persons to-
ward the free flow of skilled labour in the 
ASEAN and to eliminate practically all re-
strictions in the temporary cross-border 
movement of the natural persons in-
volved in the provision of trade and in-
vestment. At the same time, it protects the 
integrity of member states’ borders and 
their domestic labour force (Article 1, 
MNP) (ASEAN, 2012). It would not affect 
natural persons seeking access to perma-
nent employment or to citizenship and 
residence (Article 2, MNP) (ASEAN, 
2012). 
Similarly, the establishment of the 
AEC in 2015 has also provided for the free 
flow of skilled labour migrants (as well as 
goods, investment, and capital), but it 
does not address the movements of low-
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skilled workers (Ramji-Nogales, 2017). 
The AEC is a major milestone in the re-
gional economic integration agenda in 
ASEAN. According to the new AEC Blue-
print 2025 adopted by ASEAN leaders in 
2015, it is envisaged that the 10 ASEAN 
member states are economically, sustain-
ably and gainfully integrated in the global 
economy (AEC, 2015). The governance of 
unskilled labour migration in Southeast 
Asia is much needed because the migrato-
ry flow within the region mainly compris-
es unskilled and semi-skilled workers, 
with irregular migrants facing the risk of 
exploitation and trafficking (Kneebone, 
2010; Orbeta & Gonzales, 2013). 
Moreover, the regional migration 
cooperation is framed from the security 
perspective. The ASEAN members have 
developed a regional perspective on ir-
regular migration rooted in security con-
cerns through the Manila Process 
(initiated in 1996, which is no longer ac-
tive), the Bangkok Declaration (1999), the 
ARIAT Meeting held in Manila (2000), and 
the Bali Process (2002) (Battistella, 
2002). The Bali Process initially had a lim-
ited focus on security aspects related to 
people smuggling and trafficking. Since 
2011, its scope has widened to reduce ir-
regular migration, with the 2011 agree-
ment to establish a Regional Cooperation 
Framework (RCF) (Lavenex et al., 2016). 
To facilitate the RCF’s implementation, a 
Regional Support Office (RSO) of the Bali 
Process was established in 2012 to re-
duce irregular migration in the Asia–
Pacific region. As an inclusive and non-
binding initiative of the Bali Process, the 
RCF seeks to address the root causes of 
irregular movement, promote legal migra-
tion, avoid creating pull factors within the 
region, create disincentives for irregular 
movement (such as readmission agree-
ments), promote human life and dignity, 
build the capacity to process mixed mi-
gration flows, promote information ex-
change, and share collective responsibil-
ity while respecting the sovereignty of the 
concerned states (Regional Support Office 
of the Bali Process, 2012a).  
While a regional perspective has 
been adopted to solve economic and secu-
rity problems in the ASEAN, migrant la-
bour management has been dealt with 
through bilateralism. Regionalism is im-
portant for better regularisation of migra-
tion management among the countries of 
origin, transit, and destination. The issue 
of migration is a regional issue. Regional-
ising the issue is important as migration is 
not merely a bilateral issue (Orbeta & 
Gonzales, 2013; Ramasamy, 2004). Bilat-
eralism had been the principal mode of 
migration cooperation within ASEAN. The 
Asian experience has shown that multilat-
eral and regional governance are im-
portant for supporting bilateral agree-
ments. Wickramasekera (2015) states, 
“Bilateral arrangements are accorded in-
creasing legitimacy and have greater po-
tential for impact when they are conclud-
ed in the context of regional and multilat-
eral frameworks, which help to reduce 
unequal power relations between origin 
and destination” (Wickramasekera, 
2015). According to Kneebone (2010), the 
greatest limitation in the regional migra-
tion governance is that “labor migration is 
perceived as a national issue that con-
cerns state sovereignty” rather than as a 
transnational issue. In contrast, security-
related issues, such as trafficking, have 
been viewed as regional issues with col-
laborative frameworks (Kneebone, 2010).  
There are two main challenges in the 
regional efforts on irregular migration. 
The main challenge is that irregular mi-
gration is treated separately from regular 
migration. The Bangkok Declaration on 
Irregular Migration (1999) called upon 
the signatory countries to facilitate the 
regular movement of labour in order to 
reduce irregular migration (Article 3) 
(ASEAN, 1999). Governing regular migra-
tion within the ASEAN is of fundamental 
in addressing irregular migration. The 
Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Irregular 
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Movement of Persons in Southeast Asia 
(2015) acknowledged that that the irreg-
ular movement of persons could contrib-
ute to other forms of transnational crime 
in addition of human trafficking and mi-
grant smuggling (ASEAN, 2015). Re-
searchers have called for the integration 
of labour migration into regional develop-
ment efforts and greater cooperation at 
the regional levels to reduce irregular mi-
gration (Martin & Abella, 2014). The 
ASEAN initiatives toward closer economic 
integration only address the movement of 
skilled workers. The mobility flow of low-
skilled migrant workers has yet to be ad-
dressed collectively in the region. More 
challenges have been encountered since 
the relaxing of regional borders re-
strictions, following the establishment of 
the ASEAN Community in 2015 (DGICM, 
2014).  
The second challenge is the lack of a 
regional mechanism for handling the re-
patriation of irregular migrants. No effec-
tive bilateral or regional frameworks 
specify the conditions under which un-
documented workers would be repatriat-
ed. As noted by Nesadurai (2013) “There 
is no dearth of bilateral or ASEAN agree-
ments on migrant workers; these, howev-
er, focus more on ensuring a steady sup-
ply of migrant workers, rather than on 
how migrant workers should be treated 
during their employment or when de-
tained and deported” (Nesadurai, 2013).  
The Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Mi-
gration called on the obligation of the 
country of origin to accept its nationals 
back and the obligation of the countries of 
transit and destination to provide protec-
tion and assistance where appropriate 
(Article 12). Similarly, the RSO of the Bali 
Process outlined voluntary repatriation-
capacity building and support as one of its 
projects to reduce irregular movement in 
the region (Regional Support Office of the 
Bali Process, 2012b).  
Though the ASEAN members have 
pledged enhanced cooperation in facilitat-
ing the re-admission of deportees, the 
process has only made headway in Malay-
sia since 2014 after years of diplomatic 
setbacks between Malaysia and the send-
ing states.  Prior to the existence of bilat-
eral cooperation, undocumented immi-
grants had been deported without the 
sending countries’ full cooperation, caus-
ing diplomatic setbacks. The countries of 
origin have been reluctant to take back 
their nationals and share the cost of re-
patriation despite the initial collabora-
tions established with Indonesia, the Phil-
ippines, Thailand, and Myanmar (Low & 
Mokhtar, 2017). The unilateral enforce-
ment of Malaysia’s immigration law 
weakened the effectiveness of its repatri-
ation process. A World Bank report 
(2015) suggests that “Malaysia’s repatria-
tion policies is not well balanced between 
stakeholders” (World Bank, 2015). The 
report stated that countries of origin 
could play a more active role in deporta-
tion and Malaysia should strengthen the 
bilateral MoUs’ clauses on returning 
home. Compliance with deportation could 
be made a factor for the assessment of the 
MoUs (World Bank, 2015). 
At the bilateral level, Malaysia is re-
lying on MoUs to prevent workers’ exploi-
tation by illegal brokers, labour recruit-
ment companies and human traffickers. 
As part of the national efforts to combat 
forced labour and human trafficking, Ma-
laysia regulates the recruitment of mi-
grant workers through bilateral MoUs 
with their countries of origin. These new 
MoUs establish a mechanism of recruit-
ment based on G2G procedures, without 
agents, middlemen, and private employ-
ment agencies in either country. Instead, 
recruitment is to be implemented through 
government departments (ILO, 2018). 
This paper extends the literature to exam-
ine how Malaysia has addressed the issue 
of irregular migration through bilateral 
efforts. These changes aim to prevent 
forced labour and human trafficking while 
ensuring that ethical recruitment is in 
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place.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Eliminating Intermediaries through G2G 
Recruitment 
In the labour migration history of 
Malaysia, there have been several foreign 
worker crises that resulted in diplomatic 
tensions in which the countries of origin 
placed moratoriums on the placement of 
their workers. The Philippines and Indo-
nesia (in 2009), followed by Cambodia (in 
2011) stopped sending their workers to 
Malaysia due to widespread abuse; the 
moratorium remained in effect until a 
new MoU was approved that enhanced 
the rights and protection of the workers. 
An inherent limitation of the existing bi-
lateral MoUs is that they are non-
standardised for different countries of 
origin, resulting in diversification in the 
recruitment process (ILO, 2016, p. 14). 
The Malaysian economy is highly depend-
ent on foreign labour. Foreign workers’ 
share of the Malaysian labour force has 
increased from 1.683 million (14.1%) in 
2010 to 2.235 million (15.5%) in 2017. 
They mainly occupied low-skilled jobs, 
contrasting with locals, who held the semi
-skilled and skilled jobs. In 2017, foreign 
workers constituted 51% of low-skilled 
jobs, 17.3% of semi-skilled jobs, and 2.7% 
of skilled jobs, in the total employment 
statistics of the country (Khazanah Re-
search Institute, 2018). As of August 31, 
2019, there were 1.99 million foreign 
workers in Malaysia. The manufacturing 
sector employed 706,502 workers, fol-
lowed by construction (429,552), planta-
tions (268,203), agricultural (150,003), 
and 130,450 domestic maids (Tay, 2019). 
Since 1984, Malaysia has regulated the 
recruitment of foreign workers through 
bilateral MoUs with fifteen source coun-
tries; Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Philippines, Laos, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
India, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, Uzbek-
istan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan 
(World Bank, 2013). 
These MoUs failed to ensure ethical 
recruitment and to regulate the migration 
costs borne by the foreign workers. De-
spite the bilateral MoUs outlining the re-
cruitment costs, the real costs were much 
higher, because migrants were charged 
hidden fees by third-party intermediaries, 
depending on the employment sector and 
the country of origin. The high migration 
cost was caused by the business-to-
business (B2B) recruitment mechanism in 
which private agencies worked with re-
cruiting agents and their sub-agents in the 
source country. This encouraged foreign 
workers to enter the country illegally to 
avoid the cost or to overstay their em-
ployment contracts to pay off their debt. 
The whole recruitment industry 
“generates gains that mostly favour third-
party intermediaries” (World Bank, 
2015).  
The foreign-worker recruitment 
process was lengthy and complicated, 
with many parties involved at various 
points along the chain.  At the bottom of 
the chain, foreign workers were paying a 
huge amount of money to the sub-agents 
in their home country, to the international 
recruitment agents in Malaysia, and to 
Malaysian employment agents. The hiring 
of foreign workers is a lucrative industry 
due to the outsourcing of functions to pri-
vate agencies and the unregulated activi-
ties of these agents (Lee & Idrus, 2018). 
An ILO report titled “Situation and gap 
analysis on Malaysian legislation, policies 
and programmes, and the ILO Forced La-
bour Convention and Protocol” revealed 
that migrant workers were vulnerable to 
various forced-labour practices, including 
fraudulent recruitment, deception about 
the type of employment, breaches of con-
tract, payment of excessive recruitment 
fees, reduction or non-payment of sala-
ries, retention of passports by employers, 
excessive working hours, and conditions 
leading to debt bondage, under the exist-
ing recruitment system (Lee & Idrus, 
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2018). 
The 2012 Malaysia–Bangladesh MoU 
is an example of a G2G attempt to elimi-
nate private recruiters. Under the G2G 
agreement, recruitment and deployment 
were handled by the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Manpower, Employment, and Training 
(Migrant Forum in Asia, 2017). The agree-
ment set the minimum monthly wage at 
MYR 900, introduced an online applica-
tion system, and fixed recruitment fees at 
Tk 40,000 (US$ 520). It targeted the re-
cruitment of 30,000 Bangladeshis in the 
plantation sector with standard employ-
ment contracts and reduced the recruit-
ment fees borne by Bangladeshi workers 
to discourage the practice of overstaying 
their contracts to pay off their debts (ILO, 
2016).  
The activities of private recruiters 
under private management to procure 
Bangladeshi workers in 2007–2008 re-
sulted in an overflow of Bangladeshi 
workers, some sent by non-existing pri-
vate companies. Many of them who did 
not secure a job and were left stranded 
slept at the Bangladesh High Commission 
in Kuala Lumpur, many of whom had to 
return home. In 2007, Malaysia banned 
recruitment of workers from Bangladesh 
until the new MoU based on the G2G mod-
el was signed in 2012, aiming to eliminate 
agents’ involvement. It successfully re-
duced the migration cost from Tk 1.6 lakh, 
under the B2B system, to Tk 40,000 to 
work in Malaysia (Palma, 2015). Howev-
er, the G2G model was strongly protested 
by private agencies in both countries and 
the employing companies, who preferred 
the B2B. Private agents lost their liveli-
hoods while Malaysian employers had to 
bear the cost of levy, previously borne by 
workers. As a result of powerful lobbying 
from the private agents, the G2G labour 
recruitment system failed; only 10,000 
workers were recruited under the system 
(Palma, 2015; Tusher, 2016). 
In 2016, Bangladesh and Malaysia 
initiated the G2G-Plus modality under 
which private firms were allowed to send 
workers to Malaysia, with a target of re-
cruiting 1.5 million Bangladeshi workers, 
men and women, for the plantation, ser-
vice, manufacturing, and construction sec-
tors, with three-year contracts. Employ-
ers were responsible for the repatriation 
cost of each worker, capped at MYR 1,985 
maximum, in addition to workers’ securi-
ty deposits, levies, visa fees, and health 
and compensation insurance (Carvalho, 
2016). However, the G2G-Plus agreement 
failed to provide a low-cost and transpar-
ent system of recruitment. Under the G2G
-Plus operation between 2016 and 2018, 
workers were charged excessively—Tk 4 
lakh (MYR 19,000). The system was not 
transparent, as there were only ten Bang-
ladeshi companies allowed to recruit 
Bangladeshi workers, resulting in the mo-
nopolisation of the foreign-worker indus-
try. Again in September 2018, Malaysia 
suspended the recruitment of Bangla-
deshi workers (Recruitment in Malaysia, 
2020). The suspension applied as well to 
the online platform, the Foreign Worker 
Application System (SPPA), which only 
allowed 10 appointed agencies to recruit. 
The Bangladeshi Expatriates’ Welfare and 
Overseas Employment Minister insisted 
that Bangladesh would not allow the cost 
of migration to increase; thus, the two 
countries began negotiations on a new 
recruitment mechanism (Voon, 2019).  
Malaysia confronted another foreign 
worker crisis with Nepal. In May 2018, 
the new Nepalese government barred its 
citizens from working in Malaysia due to 
its restrictive immigration requirements. 
The recruitment process was complex, 
with migrant workers having to go 
through various immigration require-
ments (i.e., security, health checks, immi-
gration clearance) conducted by different 
private companies, as part of the visa re-
quirements. The complex mechanism cre-
ated many layers of intermediaries, each 
layer having its own costs. Nepal ques-
tioned whether the involvement of pri-
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vate companies was necessary, urging the 
Malaysian government to reduce the visa 
costs, which amounted to 19,000 Nepali 
rupees (MYR 700), and demanded a sim-
ple, transparent, and cost effective re-
cruitment process (Nepal ready to negoti-
ate MOU, 2018).  
More specifically, Nepal protested 
against the virtual monopoly of the re-
cruitment process, in the hands of a pri-
vate company appointed by Malaysia to 
handle the medical screening process, to 
the exclusion of other companies. The 
new Nepalese government, which took 
over the administration in February 2018, 
took a firm position against Malaysia’s 
recruitment policy, which required mi-
grant workers to go through a single 
agency (Bestinet, Sdn. Bhd.) designated 
by the Malaysian government to carry out 
pre-departure biomedical screening. 
There were only 37 medical centres in 
Nepal accredited by Malaysia to ensure 
that medical screening was performed 
according to Malaysian requirements and 
its results properly integrated and up-
loaded to the system. Apart from the MYR 
100 medical fees charged by Bestinet, 
there were additional fees collected by 
other providers for Immigration Security 
Clearance (ISC), Visa Luar Negara (VLN), 
and the services of the One Stop Centre 
(OSC) (Perumal, 2018).  
The Malaysian government was crit-
icised for outsourcing the duties of the 
Immigration Department to private agen-
cies. Work-visa processing was out-
sourced to a private company (Ultra Kira-
na, Sdn. Bhd.), and passport processing 
was outsourced to One Stop Centre (OSC), 
both of which chose a Kathmandu-based 
partner, VLN Nepal, to perform the task. 
Biometric health screening was out-
sourced to Bestinet Sdn. Bhd., who part-
nered with the Nepal Health Professional 
Federation to carry out biometric screen-
ing through its 37 medical centres. Previ-
ously, workers could process visas 
through any agency and obtain medical 
tests from 200 government-approved 
health facilities. Newspapers in Nepal re-
ported that private companies worked 
together with Nepali and Malaysian busi-
nessmen and bureaucrats to profit from 
Nepali workers. Nepal’s Labour Minister, 
Gokarna Bista, responded by cracking 
down on several Kathmandu-based com-
panies accused of cheating the workers. 
In 2018, there were 400,000 Nepalis in 
Malaysia (Sapkota & Alhadjri, 2018). 
Labour relations between the two 
countries underwent a crisis when 
Nepal’s Ministry of Labour, Employment 
and Social Security filed court cases 
against the Nepal Health Professional 
Federation and all the biomedical centres 
for cheating Nepali workers. The Kath-
mandu District Court cleared Bestinet 
from the charges on December 31, 2018. 
Directors of VLN/OSC were also sued for 
charging additional fees, and the District 
Court of Lalitpur cleared them of the 
charges. The Nepalese Government ap-
pealed to the High Court and lost. The 
High Court of Patan, in its judgment of 
January 29, 2019, declared Bestinet and 
VLN/OSC as legal, thereby declaring their 
shutdown by the Ministry of Labour as 
unlawful. The ministry was admonished, 
as the ban on Nepali workers to Malaysia 
resulted in the loss of 150 billion rupees’ 
remittance from Malaysia (Nepal courts 
cleared Malaysian firms, 2019). 
During discussions at a bilateral 
Joint Working Committee, the major de-
bate was regarding Nepal’s demand to 
decentralise the medical screening insti-
tutions from the 37 recognised medical 
centres to 122 new testing centres 
throughout Nepal. Nepal’s Ministry of La-
bour, Employment and Social Security 
hoped to ensure a level playing field for 
all private agencies and ensure transpar-
ency, while making it more convenient for 
the workers. Another major concern ex-
pressed in the talks, as part of Nepal’s mi-
gration governance reform, was to reduce 
the undue burden on migrant workers. It 
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was unreasonable for workers to put in 
eight months of a two-year contract just 
to cover the migration costs incurred. 
Moreover, Malaysia’s agreements with 
labour-supplying countries are non-
standardised, in terms of migration cost.  
For example, foreign workers from Indo-
nesia and Bangladesh do not pay the cost, 
while Nepali workers were paying vari-
ous fees to the middlemen in both coun-
tries, causing them to be unfairly penal-
ised. Both countries agreed that it was un-
fair for Nepali workers to pay these costs 
(Dixit, 2019). 
Malaysia’s Ministry of Human Re-
sources (MOHR) agreed, in the talks be-
tween Nepal and Malaysia, to direct re-
cruitment based on G2G without interme-
diaries. Eliminating intermediaries would 
end the corruption and private compa-
nies’ monopoly of security and medical 
check-ups. The new PH government 
acknowledged that the involvement of 
third-party companies appointed by the 
previous Barisan National (BN) govern-
ment had created many problems (Best to 
Revert to Old System, 2018). New terms 
of agreement were now possible, as both 
countries had undergone changes of gov-
ernment. The Malaysian Minister of Hu-
man Resources,  M. Kulasegaran, was con-
cerned about safeguarding labour rights, 
while Nepal’s Minister for Labour, Em-
ployment and Social Security, Gokarna 
Bista, wanted Nepali workers “to spend 
less on fees, earn more and be treated 
well” (Dixit, 2019).   
  Addressing Human Trafficking and 
Forced Labour 
On October 29, 2018, in Kathmandu, 
Malaysia and Nepal signed a new MoU on 
workers’ recruitment, employment and 
repatriation. Two important elements 
were introduced —zero migration cost 
for Nepali workers and protection in line 
with ILO guidelines. The zero migration-
cost model was adopted by which Nepali 
migrant workers do not pay any fees. Em-
ployers are responsible for all expenses, 
including the recruitment service charges, 
round-trip airfare, visa fees, health check-
ups, security screening, levy charges, ac-
commodations, and health and accident 
insurance, that had previously been borne 
by the workers. Malaysian employers pay 
a service charge to Nepali recruiters of up 
to half-a-month’s salary and must deposit 
the workers’ salaries through a banking 
channel on the seventh day of the month. 
Nepali migrant workers are entitled to 
change jobs in case of labour abuses or 
their employer’s bankruptcy. They are 
allowed 15 days’ paid leave if a family 
member dies in Nepal, and in the event of 
a worker’s death, the employer is respon-
sible for repatriation of their remains 
(Mandal, 2018; Poudal, 2018).  
For the recruitment of Nepali work-
ers, according to the MoU, fair recruit-
ment practices have been adopted. Fol-
lowing the signing of the MoU, the recruit-
ment costs, estimated between MYR 
6,300 and MYR 7,900, are transferred to 
the Malaysian employers, who now must 
pay a higher cost. While they supported 
the move to improve ethical recruitment, 
as advocated under the ILO standards, 
they were not ready for the higher costs 
imposed. They urged the government to 
reduce their costs and to include more 
source countries (Rahim, 2019). Employ-
ers complained about the increase in 
manufacturing costs and the resulting 
price of goods and services, as a result of 
the new MoU. However, the MOHR was 
more concerned with the dire conse-
quences of imposed trade sanctions. Ac-
cording to the US State Department’s 
2018 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, 
Malaysia was downgraded to Tier 2. Im-
proving the MoUs was essential to curb 
human trafficking and exploitation of 
workers. The labour-supply MoU with Ne-
pal has set the precedent for improved 
and standardised agreements with other 
labour-sending countries. It addresses 
human trafficking issues and migrant 
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workers’ exploitation while conforming to 
ILO standards. After the successful con-
clusion of the MoU with Nepal, Malaysia 
began negotiating with Bangladesh, Indo-
nesia, and Vietnam to incorporate the 
ILO’s standard elements, as their current 
MoUs were expiring soon (Babulal & Ab-
dul Karim, 2018).  
In bilateral discussions with Bangla-
desh to resume the supply of foreign 
workers, Malaysia proposed a zero-cost 
recruitment model. Eliminating forced 
labour is central to avoid trade sanctions 
by the United States, in view of Malaysia’s 
having been placed on the 2019 Tier 2 
Watch List in the US State Department 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report for the 
second consecutive year. The Minister of 
Human Resources, Kulasegaran, urged 
Bangladesh to ensure a sound system to 
prevent the unchecked sending of work-
ers through private agents. Malaysia 
agreed to lift the moratorium imposed in 
2018 as soon as new terms could be final-
ised, modelled upon the Malaysia–Nepal 
MoU with regard to recruitment, employ-
ment, and repatriation (Malaysia looking 
at zero-cost system, 2020). 
Globally, industries are adopting the 
principle of zero-cost migration. As Ma-
laysia and Bangladesh worked on a new 
recruitment plan, civil society was not 
consulted in the process. Migrant rights 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
represented by Caram Asia, Tenaganita 
and the North–South Initiative, called for 
consultation with civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs), grassroots organisations, 
and stakeholders of both countries in ad-
dressing any action plan. They advocated 
the elimination of middlemen and labour 
agents in both countries, identified as the 
root cause of labour-rights exploitation. 
Instead, hiring should take place through 
a government mechanism to manage the 
selection and placement of workers in or-
der to ensure integrity in recruitment 
governance. Regular labour inspections 
can reduce forced labour and ensure com-
pliance with employment contracts. In 
addition, a redress mechanism and a 
transparent regularisation system would 
help the victims of fraud who become un-
documented. Migrant rights NGOs further 
called upon Bangladesh to facilitate the 
repatriation of its nationals by processing 
and granting their identification docu-
ments swiftly (Caram Asia et al., 2019). 
As for Cambodia, two Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) were signed in 
2015 on recruitment of foreign and do-
mestic workers, respectively. The MoUs 
ensured the systematic management of 
recruitment, employment, and repatria-
tion, while protecting Cambodian work-
ers’ rights, in accordance with ILO princi-
ples. Restructuring the recruitment pro-
cess was important to avoid human traf-
ficking and forced labour (Shah, 2015). As 
of 2015, there were 8,000 registered 
Cambodian workers, including 3,000 do-
mestic workers, in Malaysia. The two 
countries used MoUs to deal with labour 
abuse by employers, such as non-issuance 
of employment contracts, retaining work-
ers’ passports, and non-payment of wag-
es. Both MoUs provided for an employ-
ment contract in the employee’s native 
language, the settling of wages, the right 
to file complaints with Malaysia’s Labour 
Department and the inclusion of repatria-
tion mechanisms. These MoUs shared 
similar objectives of protecting workers’ 
rights by requiring recruitment through 
licensed agencies and forbidding employ-
ers to hold workers’ passports (Govt signs 
MoU, 2015). 
In 2017, Cambodia agreed to resume 
the flow of Cambodian maids after a joint 
technical committee finalised the terms of 
recruitment, training, and employment 
conditions. A six-year ban had been im-
posed by Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun 
Sen in 2011, following widespread abuse, 
including overwork, salary disputes, 
physical abuse, and death of its domestic 
maids (Kannan, 2017a). Cambodia’s Min-
istry of Labour cooperated closely with its 
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Malaysian agencies to monitor the selec-
tion, training, and sending of their work-
ers and maids to work in Malaysia. Pursu-
ant to initiatives undertaken by Cambo-
dia, a few migrant protection MoUs were 
signed. In 2017, Cambodia’s Ministry of 
Labour and the Malaysian Association of 
Foreign Maid Agencies (PAPA) signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) on 
protection and welfare of migrant domes-
tic workers. PAPA was tasked with 
providing each worker a free smartphone, 
monitoring their salary payments, and 
ensuring that employment agencies had 
signed contracts (Shah, 2017). In order to 
ensure that their welfare was protected, a 
mechanism of workplace inspection was 
carried out quarterly. Workers would be 
provided with accident and health insur-
ance at work (David, 2020). The MoA en-
sures that workers are not obligated to 
work in sectors other than those stipulat-
ed in the contract, and that they are cov-
ered by insurance. As a signatory to the 
agreement, PAPA is responsible for facili-
tating the entire employment process 
from selection, including training and re-
location of Cambodian domestic workers 
in Malaysia (Adilah, 2017).  
In addition, the recruitment agencies 
in Cambodia and Malaysia concluded a 
migrant-worker protection MoU to en-
sure the safety of Cambodian maids. The 
Association of Cambodian Recruitment 
Agencies and the Malaysia National Asso-
ciation of Employment Agencies signed an 
MoU in 2017, agreeing to work together 
to curb illegal trafficking and migration in 
the maid-trade and domestic slavery. The 
MoU outlined the responsibilities of Cam-
bodian and Malaysian agencies through-
out the employment process, from re-
cruitment, training, and management to 
eventual repatriation (Agreement Signed 
to Protect Migrant Workers, 2016). The 
collaboration was expanded in 2018 with 
a new migrant-worker protection MoU 
signed by two Cambodian recruitment 
associations with three associations from 
Malaysia. It established cooperation 
among the five migrant recruitment asso-
ciations to protect the safety of Cambodi-
an workers in Malaysia. The MoU served 
as a new mechanism to assist the Labour 
Ministry of Cambodia in ensuring that 
Cambodian migrant workers’ welfare is 
protected through cooperation with Ma-
laysian partners. With the signing of the 
MoU, Cambodia anticipated a decrease in 
the abuse of Cambodian workers 
(Kunthear, 2018). 
For Indonesian domestic workers, 
the MoUs signed in 2006 had failed to 
protect their welfare. The Malaysia–
Indonesia MoU signed in 2006 was criti-
cised for allowing Malaysian employers to 
retain passports and not providing guide-
lines on minimum wages (World Bank, 
2013). In June 2009, Indonesia, cognizant 
of the risks faced by its 230,000 maids in 
Malaysia, banned sending domestic work-
ers to Malaysia, following reports of 
maids being abused by employers. The 
issue of maid abuse resulted in Indonesi-
ans demonstrating at the Malaysian Em-
bassy’s residence in Jakarta, creating ten-
sions in bilateral relations. Malaysia’s  ef-
forts in response included inspections in 
homes, interviews of maids and employ-
ers, and establishing a helpline (Zulfakar 
& Singh, 2010).  
An MoU on the Recruitment and 
Placement of Maids was signed with Indo-
nesia in 2011, lifting the two-year ban on 
Indonesian domestic workers that had 
followed rights violation complaints 
lodged by maids that included physical 
abuse, non-payment of salary, and over-
working—as much as 14 hours a day sev-
en days a week (Purwaningsih, 2011). 
The MoU established new requirements, 
such as direct deposit of wages into bank 
accounts, passports to be retained by the 
workers, and one day off per week. Re-
cruitment fees paid by the workers were 
fixed at MYR 1,800 with another MYR 
2,711 borne by employers; standard em-
ployment contracts were obligatory, but it 
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failed to establish a minimum wage (ILO, 
2016). It was criticised by Migrant Care, 
an Indonesian NGO, who advocated that a 
standard minimum wage not be lower 
than the Malaysian standards. Though a 
joint task force was established to moni-
tor the implementation of the MoU, it was 
doubtful that the mechanism would en-
sure that the terms would be implement-
ed (Purwaningsih, 2011).  
Migrant protection, especially for 
domestic workers, was weak. Migrant 
Care estimated about 120 deaths of Indo-
nesians in Malaysia from 2016 to 2018. 
Human trafficking was the principal driv-
er of domestic slavery abroad. Many were 
victims of human trafficking syndicates 
and worked in the country illegally; Indo-
nesians seeking employment abroad were 
more vulnerable to human trafficking due 
to legal migration being costly and com-
plex.  Migrant Care called on the Indone-
sian Government to ensure cheaper and 
safer procedures for migrant workers to 
prevent their falling prey to trafficking 
syndicates. As the existing MoU between 
the two countries expired in 2016, the 
two governments began to work on a new 
MoU that would safeguard Indonesians 
abroad (Barker, 2018). In February 2018, 
the death of an Indonesian domestic 
worker in Penang prompted Indonesia to 
consider halting the recruitment of its do-
mestic workers for work in Malaysia. The 
case stirred debates in Indonesia on the 
lack of protection for migrant workers 
abroad. From Indonesia’s point of view, a 
moratorium would allow the country to 
restructure the employment system to 
prevent similar cases. Indonesia also con-
sidered introducing a minimum wage re-
quirement (Indonesia mulls ban, 2018). 
For Malaysia, the freeze would only cause 
Indonesian citizens to enter illegally, as 
long as the demand is high. Illegal recruit-
ment would subject workers to abuse and 
exploitation, paving the way to human 
trafficking. Malaysia urged Jakarta not to 
ban legal migration (Lokman & Fong, 
2018). 
Tenaganita, a Malaysian-based NGO, 
believed that recruiting through private 
agencies involved excessive costs, leading 
potential migrants to resort to trafficking 
syndicates.  According to statistics of the 
Malaysian Maid Employers’ Association 
(MAMA), there were more than 250,000 
registered domestic workers in Malaysia 
in 2017. One of every 20 maids ran away 
from their employers, largely due to 
abuse, poor working conditions, or a de-
sire for freedom and better opportunities 
elsewhere. Tenaganita welcomed Malay-
sia’s new efforts to introduce direct hiring 
of domestic helpers from nine selected 
countries—Indonesia, Thailand, Cambo-
dia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Vi-
etnam, Laos, and Myanmar. The elimina-
tion of agents is a step forward in reduc-
ing the costs (Abu Bakar, 2017). 
Effective January 1, 2018, direct hir-
ing of domestic workers was implement-
ed through the Online Maids System 
(SMO). Under this system, operated by 
the Immigration Department, employers 
could hire a maid in eight days with a low-
er fee of MYR 1,635. Previously, employ-
ers paid between MYR 12,000 and 18,000. 
The SMO is an efficient and cost-effective 
system which eliminates intermediaries 
and makes it affordable for lower-income 
Malaysian households to hire maids. To 
be eligible, the maids must already be in 
the country with a valid or expired social 
visit pass. A fine of MYR 900 would be 
charged if employers attempt to hire 
maids who have overstayed their con-
tracts. Employers must purchase medical, 
accident, and life insurance and have a 
written work contract with their employ-
ees (Kannan, 2017b).  
The SMO addresses the welfare of 
domestic maids through a standard 
agreement outlining the duties and re-
sponsibilities of both employer and em-
ployee. Among other regulations, employ-
ers shall provide reasonable accommoda-
tions, basic amenities, and adequate daily 
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meals; shall require the domestic worker 
to engage in only household duties; and 
shall insure the domestic worker with the 
Foreign Worker Compensation Scheme, 
with regard to medical expenses. Moreo-
ver, the SMO has a screening mechanism 
in place to red-flag and exclude Malaysian 
employers with a bad record—a criminal 
record, a history of bankruptcy, or of non-
payment of wages. After employers have 
passed the screening stage, they are as-
sessed as to their ability to pay wages on 
time through bank accounts. Between Jan-
uary 1 and March 1, 2018, about 10,054 
Malaysians signed up, and 1,616 potential 
foreign maids registered on the system. 
The Immigration Department approved 
the employment of 295 foreign maids 
during that period (Lokman & Fong, 
2018). 
Another positive development aim-
ing to tackle human trafficking was the 
abolishment of outsourcing companies. 
Outsourcing agencies were attributed 
with unfair treatment of workers, cases of 
human trafficking, and various other un-
favourable complaints (Zainul, 2018). Ef-
fective March 31, 2019, the outsourcing to 
third parties of recruiting and managing 
foreign workers was terminated. The 
move, according to the Malaysian Em-
ployers Federation, was adopted to en-
sure better treatment of foreign workers. 
Labour contractors are profit-orientated; 
they strive to pay the minimum to work-
ers while charging exaggerated fees to 
employers. MOHR took over the task of 
supplying foreign workers, which was 
previously outsourced by the Home Min-
istry to more than 100 outsourcing com-
panies and involved 26,000 foreign work-
ers. Outsourcing companies have to seek 
new employers or repatriate their out-
sourced foreign workers. Outsourced for-
eign workers not absorbed by new em-
ployers became illegal if they stayed in 
Malaysia after March 31, 2019 (Zainal, 
2019). 
Tackling Illegal Migration and Repatria-
tion  
Malaysia is resorting to bilateral 
MoUs as an instrument to secure the co-
operation of the countries of origin in the 
deportation of overstaying migrants. The 
issues of irregular migration and foreign 
workers who overstay, among others, 
were discussed during negotiations with 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Pri-
or to the signing of labour agreements, 
Malaysia hoped to solve the issue of ille-
gal foreign workers, which affected Ma-
laysia’s status in the US TIP reports. The 
MOHR maintained that renewed MoUs 
must include enforcement provisions for 
illegal foreign workers, and that the coun-
tries of origin must commit to taking back 
their nationals who overstay their em-
ployment contracts and become undocu-
mented. According to Kulasegaran, “What 
we are saying now is very simple – if you 
send workers to my country, you must 
send the best workers, you must send dis-
ciplined people” (Malaysia to go slow on 
labour MoU, 2018).   
In the past, the sending states’ un-
willingness to cooperate in the repatria-
tion of irregular migrants further strained 
bilateral ties. The intensification of raids, 
detention, and deportation has created 
interstate conflicts, especially with Indo-
nesia.  The bilateral tension with Indone-
sia heightened in 2002 when Malaysia 
carried out its national crackdown code 
Ops Nyah II Bersepadu and the mass de-
portation of irregular migrants. Indone-
sian officials criticised the inhumane 
treatment of Indonesian illegal migrants 
in Malaysian detention centres. The im-
mediate deportation also created over-
crowding in the Indonesian transit ports. 
While Malaysia complained that Indone-
sia had been uncooperative in assisting 
with the repatriation process, Indonesia 
deemed Malaysia inconsiderate of the 
pressing economic situation in Indonesia 
when handling deported migrants (Liow, 
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2003). Similarly, the Philippines demand-
ed a halt to Malaysia’s mass deportation 
operations in 2002 and asked for the Phil-
ippine mission to examine the conditions 
of Filipino detainees in Malaysia’s deten-
tion centres. In 2005, a Philippine-
Malaysia Joint Commission on Sabah Re-
patriates was established to facilitate the 
repatriation of Filipino nationals back to 
the Philippines (Nesadurai, 2013). 
The Malaysia–Indonesia deal on re-
patriation in 2014 stipulated that Indone-
sia agreed to bear the costs of its citizens’ 
airfare and travel documents, while Ma-
laysia dropped all charges on the irregu-
lar migrants. More importantly, Indonesia 
agreed to shoulder the repatriation costs, 
which had been a thorny issue for the Ma-
laysian government. The first batch of 494 
Indonesian deportees was released from 
immigration depots, its biometrics were 
taken, and the group was dispatched in 
December 2014, using five Indonesian 
military planes. It was the first joint immi-
gration deal between the nations. Malay-
sia benefited from the agreement in terms 
of reducing the administrative, human 
resource, and financial costs of operating 
the detention centers (Cheng, 2014). The 
repatriation mission was implemented in 
coordination with the Indonesian embas-
sy in Malaysia. The Indonesian military’s 
involvement was evident in the use of its 
Air Force’s Hercules planes to repatriate 
irregular Indonesian workers (Marbun, 
2014). Subsequent repatriation opera-
tions in 2015 were carried out via low-
cost commercial planes. As of December 
9, 2015, in total, 27,000 Indonesian illegal 
immigrants were sent home. Those repat-
riated were blacklisted from entering Ma-
laysia within a period of one to five years, 
depending on the offenses committed. In-
donesia will undertake capacity-building 
programs for its citizens who have been 
repatriated to avoid illegal re-entry into 
Malaysia, following the two countries’ 
mutual agreement to reduce the number 
of undocumented workers (Shahar, 
2015). 
Malaysia and the Philippines signed 
a deal on the repatriation of Filipino ille-
gal immigrants in 2016. During Philippine 
President Rodrigo Duterte’s visit to Kuala 
Lumpur, he agreed to take back in stages 
the 7,000 undocumented Filipinos resid-
ing illegally in Sabah, while Malaysia’s for-
mer Prime Minister, Najib Razak, agreed 
to provide the Malaysian naval fleet to fa-
cilitate the return. The first batch of de-
portees to Zamboanga (Philippines) con-
sisted of 400 Filipinos, who were de-
tained in the Sandakan temporary deten-
tion center. The agreement was also mili-
tary in nature as the Philippines agreed to 
open up its international waters to Malay-
sian and Indonesian maritime forces to 
hunt the ASG (Sabah deports 400 Filipino 
illegals, 2016). 
Myanmar’s cooperation in repatriat-
ing its nationals was noticeable, especially 
during Malaysia’s national crackdown. In 
2016, approximately 2,000 Myanmar mi-
grant workers were detained across Ma-
laysia, with over 300 having served their 
sentences but could not afford to return 
home, even after the citizenship verifica-
tion process was completed. The lack of 
funding was critical when earlier plans to 
repatriate over 700 Myanmar workers 
had been cancelled. In July 2016, Myan-
mar announced another repatriation plan, 
with chartered flights and financial aid 
from private donors, such as the KBZ 
Brighter Future Myanmar Foundation and 
Myanmar Airline International, which 
eased the process (Nyan, 2016a). In a pe-
riodic visit to the detention camps, the 
Myanmar embassy officials arranged for 
repatriation, prioritising women, chil-
dren, and elderly people (Nyan, 2016b). 
The Myanmar embassy in Kuala Lumpur 
assisted in checking the detainees’ identi-
ties, leading to the swift issuance of travel 
documents. It privatised the repatriation 
by allowing two business groups to verify 
the citizenship of Myanmar migrants in 
the detention camps and to charge each 
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person RM650 (US$160) (Zaw, 2016).  
The Cambodia–Malaysia collabora-
tion in repatriation was outlined in two 
MoUs signed in 2015. The MoU on the Re-
cruitment and Employment of Workers 
and the MoU on the Recruitment and Em-
ployment of Domestic Workers were sig-
nificant to the repatriation process as 
both included an article on the process of 
repatriating workers and domestic work-
ers (Shah, 2015). 
 The lack of funding of Cambodia’s 
embassy in Kuala Lumpur was the main 
issue confronted in the repatriation pro-
cess. Thus, NGOs paid the fines for visa 
overstaying, while the International Or-
ganization for Migration sponsored the 
Cambodian workers’ flights. The number 
of Cambodians seeking shelter at the em-
bassy increased, following the enforce-
ment operation Ops Mega that started on 
July 1, 2017 (Peter, 2017). In addition to 
those evading the immigration raids, 
some Cambodian workers were escaping 
from their employers due to abuse and 
mistreatment. They approached the em-
bassy to help them receive their final 
wages and return home. The Cambodian 
Embassy in Kuala Lumpur worked with 
Malaysian authorities in the repatriation 
process (Sotheary, 2017).  
In the case of Bangladesh, ministeri-
al discussions sought ways of repatriating 
undocumented Bangladeshi workers and 
overstaying workers. Strengthening labor 
relations was part of Malaysian–
Bangladeshi bilateral efforts to address 
the issues of high recruitment fees and 
exploitation in the recruitment system 
(Malaysia wants to work with Bangla-
desh, 2018). 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, Malaysia has 
improved its migration governance at the 
national and bilateral levels through the 
elimination of agents, private actors, and 
outsourcing companies rooted in the sys-
tem. An institutional reform on direct 
government recruitment was implement-
ed to ensure a higher standard of employ-
ment and ethical recruitment. Previous 
recruitment agreements based on B2B 
opened the way to various forms of abuse 
due to the active role played by private 
actors, misconduct by recruiting agents, 
failure to protect labour rights, and high 
migration costs borne by the migrant 
workers. The newly-introduced G2G re-
cruitment, as in the case of Nepal, attempt 
to address the root causes of workers’ 
vulnerability through the principles of ze-
ro migration cost and fair recruitment 
policies. The failed experiences of G2G 
and G2G-Plus with Bangladesh illustrated 
clearly that the interests of recruitment 
agencies in both countries dominated 
over the interests of migrant workers. By 
renegotiating all the MoUs based on ILO 
standards, Malaysia has demonstrated 
that migrant workers are not to be treat-
ed as a commodity, and the foreign work-
ers’ industry should not be treated as a 
for-profit trade.  Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
and Cambodia have yet to resume sending 
their migrant workers until a better mi-
grant protection system is in place. 
The adoption of zero migration costs 
and the employer-pays-recruitment mod-
el showed that migrant welfare is being 
taken seriously by the MOHR, after dec-
ades of the hard-line approach—raids, 
detention, and deportation of undocu-
mented migrants. While these reforms 
strengthen the mechanisms of legal mi-
gration, much of their implementation 
will depend on the enforcement of nation-
al labour laws. Eliminating recruitment 
fees has only partially addressed the issue 
of migrant welfare; there are other as-
pects of irregular migration, such as sys-
tematic regularisation programmes, hu-
mane deportation, and migrant rights 
protection, yet to be resolved at the na-
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